The key that never exists
Who can decrypt on Celar? No one, ever. The decryption key is born distributed across a 100-seat committee, needs a threshold quorum to act, and refreshes every epoch.
A number you can check
Every chain says it's secure. Celar publishes ℋ = attack cost / value at risk ≥ 2 — a constitutional floor, with every input published and recomputable.
Privacy claims you can check
PF-1 is an open privacy label — which data a protocol hides, from which adversaries, under which assumptions, and what still leaks. Making privacy claims comparable and falsifiable.
Prove vs. compute: what ZK and FHE can actually hide
Zero-knowledge proves facts about data you hold; FHE computes on data nobody can read. Why a confidential chain needs both — FHE for state, stealth for recipients, a ZK pool for collusion-proof anonymity.
Introducing Celar
The confidential smart-contract Layer 1: a chain that computes on data nobody can read — threshold FHE, stealth addresses, a ZK shielded pool, and a security metric you can falsify.